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George P Smith II
Great Expectations Or Convoluted Realities:
Artificial Insemination In Flux
The socio-legal mysteries of artificial insemina-
tion are being resolved. Yet, as they give way to
solution, others evolve into permutations within
the penumbric haze of the subject area, itself. One
particular paradigm of judicial decision making
which holds clearly the expectation of anticipated
rationality yet, at the same time, holds a distinct
prospect for convolution, is to be seen in the case
of Fitzgemld v Rueckl which will be argued before
the Nevada Supreme Court, September 15,
1981.1 Before approaching an exegesis of this
case, however, it is important to sketch the
background of the central problems which arise
within the total area of concern, itself.
Generally in dealing with heterologous artificial
insemination cases (AID), the donor is unknown.
The quintessential issues here involve whether the
putative father, (ie, the husband of the artificially
inseminated mother), becomes the real father of
the artificially conceived child and whether the
wife has committed adultery by participating in
such an act with or without her husband's con-
sent.
In 1948, the New York Supreme Court recog-
nized that a woman artificially inseminated by a
third party donor, with her husband's consent,
gave birth to a legitimate child. The woman's
husband was "entitled to the same rights as that
acquired by a foster parent who has formally
adopted a child, if not the same rights as those to
which a natural parent under the circumstances
would be entitled." 2
With the case of Gursky v Gursky3 in 1963,
however, a New York trial court held that even
though a husband consents to his wife's use of
AID, the child is nonetheless, illegitimate. A con-
siderably more enlightened and contemporary
California Supreme Court in People v Sorensen4
in 1968 rejected the Gursky thesis and proceeded
to hold that a husband who gives his consent to
his wife's use of AID intervention, cannot disclaim
his lawful fatherhood of the child for the purpose
of child support. The court construed a state penal
George P Smith 11 BS, JD (Indiana) LLM (Columbia), Profes-
sor of Law, The Catholic University of America, School of
Law, Distinguished Visiting Scholar, Kennedy Institute of
Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington DC.
nonsupport statute to incorporate liability of a
consenting father of the AID child, finding a gene-
tic relationship, as such, unnecessary in order to
establish the required father-child relationship.5
A considerable degree of sophistication was
shown by the New York Supreme Court in 1973
with its holding in Adoption of Anonymous. 6 In-
stead of adhering blindly to Gursky, the court
found a strong state policy favoring legitimacy
and, further, that a child born of consensual artifi-
cial insemination by a donor, accomplished as
such during a valid marriage, is legitimate and
thereby entitled to enjoy all rights and privileges of
a child who is conceived in a natural way by the
same marriage.
Since Sorensen and Anonymous, several states
have passed legislation legitimizing the offspring
of AID when the husband consents to the proce-
dure.7 These judicial and legislative developments
indicate clearly that both branches of government
no longer equate AID with adultery and may even
signal the public's willingness to sanction more
startling genetic developments.8
In New Jersey, it was held recently that an un-
married woman, who conceived a child through
sperm artificially donated by a friend, was - de-
spite her wishes - but consistent with what was
perceived as the best interests of the child - to
allow custodial and visitation rights for the donor.
The court recognized the donor as the natural
father, even though refusing to take a specific
position on the propriety of the use of artificial
insemination between unmarried persons, and
went further in both recognizing and imposing
upon him the responsibility to support and main-
tain the child.9
Interestingly, a 1969 Harris opinion survey of
some 1,600 adults throughout the country relative
to advances and applications of the "new" biol-
ogy, revealed a most intriguing attitudinal profile.
Nineteen percent of all interviewed approved of
AID, while 56 percent disapproved of the process.
Where the only method for a married couple to
conceive a family involved use of heterologous
insemination (AID), 35 percent of those inter-
viewed approved of the technique. Forty-nine per-
cent of the men interviewed in the survey agreed in
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principle with homologous insemination (AIH)
(semen taken from the putative husband) while 62
percent of the women expressed their approval of
allowing their husband's semen to be used,
through artificial means of injection, in order to
inseminate them.' 0
II
As might be expected, the facts of Fitzgerald v
Ruecki are disputed by each party." What is con-
clusive, however, is that Michael P Fitzgerald and
his former wife, Rulanda, have maintained indi-
vidual actions against Dr Frank V Rueckl seeking
money damages stemming from acts of artificial
insemination performed in 1972 by Dr Rueckl on
Rulanda Fitzgerald. Mr Fitzgerald asserted the
physician had an obligation to obtain his written
consent before inseminating his wife; that he
should not be held responsible for any of the
child's subsequent medical bills, which originally
totalled over $40,000 and have presently been
reduced to $15,000, and that he and his former
wife should be awarded damages for the
psychological strain on them individually and on
their marriage stemming from the circumstances
of her pregnancy and the baby's condition.
The plaintiff, Michael Fitzgerald, divorced his
first wife, and the mother of his five children, in
1969. Before the divorce, however, the plaintiff
began living with his future wife, Rulanda; and a
healthy son, Michael, was born in March, 1967, of
this relationship. Two years after his divorce was
finalized, the plaintiff married Rulanda, February 3,
1971. Prior to the validation of his second mar-
riage, Mr Fitzgerald had a vasectomy. Sub-
sequent to their marriage, the plaintiffs decided to
seek medical advice relative to the possibilities of
reversing the vasectomy. Notified that such
surgery was quite painful and carried no real
chance for success, the plaintiffs sought other al-
ternatives to explore for their joint wish to have
additional children. Adoption was rejected by
both. Thereupon, consultation was undertaken
with a physician in Oakland, California, where the
plaintiffs then resided, relative to the feasibility of
AID. The risks to Rulanda and the possible
psychological consequences to her husband were
all discussed. The Oakland physician started an
ovulation chart with Rulanda in order to determine
when she was disposed to a successful AID inter-
vention.
In the meantime, Mr Fitzgerald had moved to
Reno, Nevada. Having ascertained that his wife
wished to proceed with the procedure, the Plan-
ned Parenthood Organization was contacted,
where it was learned that only one physician in
Reno was performing artificial insemination, Dr
Frank V Rueckl.
According to the defendant's pleadings, he ad-
vised Mr Fitzgerald of a number of considerations
that should be discussed before AID could be ad-
ministered. The doctor was advised that
Fitzgerald was fully cognizant of all the matters
connected with the entire procedure and was thus
requested to proceed. Thereupon Mr Fitzgerald
and his wife prepared a family background record
and the wife executed a written consent form. In-
terestingly, Nevada has no law requiring consent
of a husband in matters of this nature or, for that
matter, any laws regarding artificial insemination.
Rulanda made three separate monthly appoint-
ments with Dr Rueckl for the purpose of being
artificially inseminated.
Two months into the pregnancy, Fitzgerald
communicated to Dr Rueckl his inability to accept
the present condition of his wife. Because of re-
ligious beliefs, a therapeutic abortion was not con-
sidered to be a feasible alternative. About a month
later, Mr Fitzgerald became abusive and forced
his wife to leave their home and return to Califor-
nia where she had a relative with whom she could
live. Later correspondence and a spirit of recon-
ciliation fostered by Fitzgerald, brought his wife
back to Reno. Before the birth of the child, how-
ever, Fitzgerald acknowledged the child to be as
his own. After the child was born, however, he
again became abusive with his wife and new son.
In June, 1974, the plaintiffs separated. The in-
fant was healthy up to approximately three
months; at that age, he "failed to thrive" and was
treated at the medical centers at Stanford Univer-
sity and the University of California in San Fran-
cisco. During the treatment it was never deter-
mined that the child's condition was the result of
the actual AID intervention. Before the age of two,
the child died with, interestingly, no autopsy and
no specific cause of death having been estab-
lished. The plaintiffs divorced following the death
of the child. Again, rather interestingly, the di-
vorce decree contained no provision that either
the first child born of Rulanda and Michael's rela-
tionship out of wedlock nor the second one con-
ceived artificially within the state of matrimony
was fathered by Mr Fitzgerald. Thus, it is ques-
tionable as to the extent of the legal liability on the
part of Mr Fitzgerald for any "necessaries" in the
form of medical services provided to the second
son during his life.
It was ruled at trial by District Court Judge
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James Guinan that the husband's written consent
was not needed before his wife underwent artificial
insemination (a fair and objective reading of the
facts would easily give rise to an implied consent
on Mr Fitzgerald's part for the AID); that the doc-
tor's right to refuse disclosure of the identity of the
sperm donor would be upheld and that Mr
Fitzgerald was not responsible for the medical
bills incurred in keeping the child alive for nearly
two years.
The pertinent Nevada statute relative to con-
sent states that consent of a patient for a medical
or surgical procedure is obtained if: it is explained
to the patient in general terms without specific
detail the procedures to be undertaken. Explana-
tion is given to the patient of the alternative
methods of treatment, if any, and their general
nature and, furthermore, explanation is made that
risks may exist, together with the general nature
and extent of the risks involved, yet without
specific enumeration of the specific risks being set
out. The patient's signature is obtained to a
statement containing an explanation of the proce-
dure, alternative methods of treatment and risks
involved as provided by the statute, itself.12
Persuasive authority exists, however, for the
proposition that the consent of a married woman
in full possession of her faculties is sufficient to
authorize performance of medical or surgical
treatment on her without any consent on the part
of her husband.13 Nor, for that matter, need a
physician even notify the husband of the possible
effects of treatment which, according to the ac-
cepted standards of his profession, he regards
necessary to administer to the wife. 14 Today, with
the social recognition and recognized importance
of women's rights, as well as of the woman's self
determination or autonomy over her own body,
the issue of a husband's consent being necessary
for an act to be performed on his wife's body - as
in this case - is of less significance.15 Yet, since
Dr Rueckl apparently never advised Rulanda
Fitzgerald that a child born of an artificial impreg-
nation might be born with "something wrong"
genetically or otherwise, one extended theory of
plaintiff Rulanda's case to develop an appeal is
whether - as to Rulanda, herself - a truly in-
formed consent was given.
FAILURE TO THRIVE
Failure to thrive, or the "something went wrong
factor" here in the Fitzgerald case, is a pediatric
syndrome in which the child or infant falls below
the third percentile in height and weight and is
demonstrably unable to develop and frequently
dies. In the vast majority of the cases, a specific
underlying organic cause can be identified. Often
times the identification results only after an
exhaustive and elaborate series of laboratory
examinations. A number of these organic
maladies involve the gastrointestinal system and
can be attributed to congenital or inherited de-
fects; these include congenital atresias, mediasti-
nal tumors which compress the GI tract, making
feeding difficult if not impossible, hiatus hernia
and sometimes post surgical anatomical con-
structions. Other inherited defects include en-
zymatic deficiencies, immune defects including
food allergies, malabsorption syndromes, in-
flammatory bowel diseases and acquired prob-
lems such as intestinal parasites. Disease of the
cardiovascular and renal systems have also been
associated with failure to thrive, usually involving
a common metabolic defect such as uremia or
hypoperfusion with decreasing cell metabolism. 17
In approximately forty percent of failure to th-
rive cases, despite the most sophisticated testing,
no organic problem can be identified. A number of
cases have shown that emotional and psychiatric
deprivation may be the basis for the failure to
thrive'7 The pivotal individual in these cases is the
child's mother. Similar to child abuse cases, one
authority has described with precision how the
mother often has profound emotional and
psychiatric problems of her own and is usually not
equipped to deal with the added problems of a
newborn infant.' 8 In many of the reported cases,
early detection of the problem and removal of
infant from the stressful situation results in the
child returning to a thriving condition.19
In order for the Fitzgeralds to establish liability
on a failure to thrive theory, Rulanda must prove:
1) that all organic causes were excluded; 2) that
her pregnancy was normal and she did not subject
the fetus to any extraordinary risks which would
include any and all drugs, ionizing radiation and
electromagnetic radiation - such as microwaves;
3) if an organic cause is established (and this is the
most difficult by far to establish) and the cause
was inherited, she must then show that the gene-
tic defect or inheritable trait was transmitted by
the donor and not by her own ovum; and 4) if no
organic defect is found, she must bear the burden
of establishing that any emotional, non-organic,
basis for the failure to thrive was not due to her
interaction - or failure to interact properly -
with the child. 20 Thus it can be seen that this
particular theory of liability will be most difficult
(if, indeed, not impossible) for the Fitzgeralds to
recover under.
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INFORMED CONSENT
At the January, 1979, meeting of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science in
Houston, Texas, Dr JK Sherman, Professor of
Anatomy at the University of Arkansas School for
Medical Sciences and a leader in designing na-
tional and international standards for human
semen cryobanking, noted that of the normal
population, a seven percent rate of defectiveness is
to be found, while of the studies made of those
women who conceived artificially, through AID
using frozen semen, less than one percent of the
issue born were genetically defective. 21 Query:
was the statistical probability of genetic error oc-
curring so significant that Dr Rueckl should have
advised Rulanda of the distinct possibility of
something going wrong in her use of AID?
The parameters of the Doctrine of Informed
Consent are so fluid and flexible that the lengths to
which a physician must go in order to obtain a
truly informed consent from a patient are "ill de-
fined at best." 22 While some authorities would
argue it is vitally important to include virtually all
known complications and risks, others note con-
vincingly that in order to obtain a legally binding
informed consent, only revelation of significant -
as opposed to insignificant - risk is necessi-
tated.23 Utilizing a rule of reason in order to re-
solve the conundrum, the average ordinary
"reasonable" physician should be guided by the
basic realization that if there is, indeed, a high
(statistical) risk of danger associated with a medi-
cal intervention of whatever kind, that risk should
be explained fully to the patient and - in turn -
an informed consent obtained. 24
NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE
Another theory of recovery sought by the plain-
tiffs is that of negligence or, in other words, mal-
practice on the part of Dr Rueckl in administering
the act of artificial insemination. Here, again, it
will be extremely difficult for the plaintiffs to show
the birth defects were probably caused by the
physician's errors in the process of administering
artificial insemination. 25 Stated otherwise, there
is little substantial evidence of any causal connec-
tion between the conduct of Dr Rueckl and the
medical condition of Rulanda's deceased child.
For a causal connection here, a reasonable prob-
ability, not a mere possibility must be shown. 26
Nevertheless, as will be discussed later, negli-
gence on the part of Dr Rueckl in selecting the
donor may well be an act which creates a legal
liability for misappliance.
The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals
in the consolidated case of Becker v Schwartz and
Park v Chessin,27 may serve as a pertinent influ-
ence or vector of force for the Nevada High Court
in grappling with Fitzgerald v Rueckl. There the
court held that where a physician fails to apprise a
married couple with a given genetic deficiency
(profile) of the risks of bearing a handicapped
child, and, furthermore, neglects to advise of the
availability of tests for detecting the disorder, if a
genetically defective child is subsequently born,
the physician, under basic malpractice law, is li-
able to the parents for the special costs of raising
the handicapped child. Query: could not an ex-
pansive, yet rational, reading of this holding lead
the Nevada Supreme Court to conclude that Dr
Rueckl is guilty of malpractice in failing to work up
a full and careful genetic profile of the donor and
his compatibility with the co-plaintiff wife and
furthermore, failed to disclose all relevant infor-
mation to the wife in order to enable her to give an
informed consent to the AID procedure?
STRICT LIABILITY
Still another intriguing theory for recovery by
the plaintiffs is tied to the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity. More specifically, the goods (eg, the donor's
semen) were defective and, thus, the doctor
breached the warranty of fitness that all goods
must carry with them. This is a rather fanciful
case theory. In some jurisdictions, especially
California, the law is settled that a doctor diagnos-
ing and treating a patient is normally not selling
either a product or insurance. For the doctrine of
strict liability to be applicable, it must be found
that the seller (here, Dr Rueckl) was engaged in
the business of selling such a product. 2 8 To be
remembered is the fact that Dr Rueckl was a
general practitioner and not a sperm bank direc-
tor or recognized specialist in the field. Drawing as
such upon a growing number of decisions that
since defective blood is inherently dangerous and
its seller is to be held strictly liable for harm
caused therefrom, 29 a court could hold that genet-
ically defective semen was akin to defective blood
and thus impose liability for its improper use. In
fact, with donor semen procedures, certain con-
taminants and genetic diseases can be detected
easily, whereas in life saving emergency condi-
tions, the purity of donor blood is more difficult to
guarantee. Because of the inherent discrepancies
in the two cases, the court could indeed be more
willing to impose strict liability for errors in ad-
ministering artificial insemination.o
Cases have held that where the primary objec-
FAMILY LAW REVIEW / VOL. 3, SPRING 1980 / 41
tive is to obtain professional services, strict liabil-
ity and warranty do not apply. The patient's main
object is to achieve pregnancy, not to purchase
semen.31 Thus, a physician utilizes artificial in-
semination in order to assist his patient in becom-
ing pregnant, and the use of semen to achieve that
result is but incidental to the central object sought
to be accomplished. Therefore, the process of arti-
ficial insemination is arguably but a classic physi-
cian service (as in furnishing blood to a patient),
and is not subject to the doctrine of warranty or
strict liability. 32
DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY
v THE RIGHT TO KNOW
Even though the identity of the donor in the
instant Fitzgerald case was not revealed at the
lower court, he was acknowledged to be a medical
student. Dr Rueckl further acknowledged that he,
himself, spent only a few minutes talking to the
donor, thus leading to the plaintiffs' assertion that
the doctor was guilty of malpractice in failing to
properly screen the donor and ascertain his gene-
tic profile and compatibility with Rulanda. The
plaintiffs presume that there was a mismatch be-
tween the donor and Rulanda Fitzgerald and con-
tend, further, that "no admissible evidence points
to anything other than an inherited defect [from
the donor]."
There is a rather alarming precedent being set
within the field of adoption law that has serious
possibilities of jeopardizing, through broad con-
struction, donor secrecy in AID cases. District of
Columbia Court Judge Green recently ruled that a
twenty-two year old mother of two living in
Takoma Park, Maryland, who herself was
adopted as a child, should be granted permission
to see her sealed birth records and thus learn the
identities of her natural parents.33 The plaintiff in
this case asserted her basic right to know her total
historical identity, but also to discover whether
hereditary diseases or other health problems were
a part of her genetic inheritance. 34
A comparable argument could obviously be
made by the progeny of AID. The argument for
disclosure would gain even more persuasiveness
in light of recent findings discussed in the New
England Journal of Medicine. 35 Statistics from a
recent study showed that sperm from one donor
had in fact been used to produce fifty children, and
thus raised very real danger of accidental incest
among offspring who unknowingly have
the same father. 36 The article also recorded the
sloppiness of some doctors in failing to screen
genetically the donors who participate in AID
procedures. A mere twenty-nine percent of the
doctors tested the donors of semen, and then
primarily for communicable diseases. Most reci-
pients were inseminated twice per cycle. Seven-
teen percent of the physicians used the same
donor for a given recipient, and thirty-two percent
used a multiple donor within a single cycle. Only
thirty-seven percent kept records on children, and
only thirty percent on donors. The identity of
donors usually was carefully guarded to ensure
privacy to avoid legal complications. 3 7
Of seven-hundred-eleven physicians likely to
perform artificial insemination by donors sur-
veyed to determine their current practices, four-
hundred-seventy-one responded, of whom three-
hundred-seventy-nine reported that they per-
formed this procedure. They accounted for ap-
proximately three thousand five hundred
seventy-six births by this means in 1977. In addi-
tion to treating infertility, twenty-six percent of
these physicians used the procedure to prevent
transmission of a genetic disease, and ten percent
used it for single women. Donors of semen were
primarily from universities; were only superficially
screened for genetic diseases; and were then
matched phenotypically to the recipient's hus-
band.38
In Fitzgerald, the obvious reason for discovery
of the donor's identity is to impose financial liabil-
ity upon him for the progeny that he fathered. A
less obvious reason is to determine whether Dr
Rueckl took all necessary genetic and other medi-
cal precautions in selecting him.
Provisions within the Uniform Parentage Act
provide that all records involving AID interven-
tions are to be kept "confidential and in a sealed
file." Inspection of them is only sanctioned when a
court order acknowledges the existence of "good
cause." 39 Although, on balance, Fitzgerald v
Ruecki presents inadequate cause for breaching
the AID confidentiality, merely on an evidentiary
basis with no reference to the Uniform Parentage
Act not even adopted in Nevada, the day may soon
be here where a stronger case arises when donor
identity may be necessary.
As observed, by drawing upon analogous right-
to-know-parental-identity cases arising in regular
adoption areas, "good cause" in order to discern
the identity of a donor in artificial insemination
cases could be determined to exist not only for
reasons of obtaining complete medical informa-
tion regarding the child's donor "father," but for
reasons of allowing the AID child to resolve ques-
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tions of identity and promote social adjustment; to
establish a bond of love; 40 promote a wish to be of
genuine assistance and support of a biological
family unit;4 1 and to determine if the rules of intes-
tate succession were applicable. 42
The right to know parental lineage has received
recent federal attention. Efforts were undertaken
by Senator Carl Levin of Michigan in the second
session of the 96th Congress to amend The Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption
Reform Act of 1978 to provide for a national com-
puterized adoption identification center. This
proposed legislation is entitled The Adoption
Identification Act of 1980.42 The specific purpose
of the legislation is "to provide a system whereby
the natural parents, siblings, or other natural rela-
tive of an adoptee can locate each other through a
centralized computer system." 44 The Center, to be
established within the former Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, will be tied to
voluntary participation by all involved parties.
State participation through the development of
state computer centers is provided. 4 5
In essence, a natural parent, a sibling or other
natural relative or offspring submits an applica-
tion to a computerized identification center and
thereby initiates the locating process. The appli-
cation is then programmed into the national or
state computer in an effort to match the parent,
the offspring, the sibling or the other relative. All
subjects which fit the profile of the data which is
submitted are in turn printed out and made avail-
able to the particular agency involved with the
follow-up procedure. Provision is made for addi-
tional research and actual interviewing for pur-
poses of conclusively determining whether the
subjects match. Storage for computer informa-
tion of this nature is guaranteed for ten years. If no
successful match is made within this time frame,
application may be made to apply for a renewal of
the application, itself, for another ten year period.
On April 2, 1980, Senate Resolution 401 was
introduced by Senator John Tower expressing
disapproval of the proposed legislation which
would
require either automatic opening at the request of an adult
adoptee of confidential birth records, court records, and
adoption agency records and require agencies to notify
adult adoptees that a birth parent desires to meet the
adoptee even if the adoptee had not expressed a desire to
meet with his birth parents. 46
Senator Levin, in proposing his legislation, was
careful to state that it would allow adoptees and
birth parents to communicate only where there
exists mutual interest in communicating; thus any
intrusion into the life of either party or any pros-
pective violation of constitutional privacy rights
would be avoided. No action of any nature could
be taken by the center unless and until both the
adoptee and his or her natural relatives have in-
dependently made requests with the center. 47
III
As the courts begin to recognize "a best in-
terests of the child test," in deciding vexatious
cases involving artificial insemination, it would
surely appear that where genetic heritage is
brought into question concerning the health and
well-being of an AID child, the confidential files (if
such are maintained) of a participating physician
to an AID intervention, should be examined by a
judge "in camera" and, where necessary, with the
assistance of a geneticist. Public disclosure of the
donor's identity should not be revealed, 48 nor, for
that matter, should liability be imposed upon him
for "errors" that might follow as a consequence of
his participation. As has been maintained, it is the
doctor who must be held liable for error.
Perhaps the New York Court of Appeals has
heralded, with its decision in Becker v Schwartz
and Park v Chessin,49 a new judicial attitude
which will impose upon physicians a high stan-
dard of care and medical foresight, and will thus
seek to effect this purpose by tightening the deci-
sional law of malpractice. A physician who is neg-
ligent in failing to properly screen prospective
donors for artificial insemination must bear the
consequences of his errors.
Greater safeguards must be undertaken in order
to preserve the integrity of artificial insemination
as a medico-legal process. If physicians are not
sufficiently careful in their supervision and ad-
ministration of the AID process, then the states
must act in order to guarantee higher standards of
professional care. In addition to judicial activism,
legislative implementation should be sought by
creating presumptions at law of the legitimacy of
issue born of consensual AID, and thus clarify
both the legal rights and duties of the husband. To
the extent that greater confidentiality of donor
records would be strengthened, additional adop-
tions of the Uniform Parentage Act should be ad-
vocated. E
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Add the following to note 50 in the article by
Bruce Ziff Maintenance Claims In Divorce Ac-
tions: Goldstein Revisited (1979)2 FamLRev 186,
191:
See contra Gigantes v Gigantes (1980) 12 RFL(2d)171
(Ont HC) wherein Boland J held that§11 did not permit
one party to seek an order on behalf of the other party, that
other being perfectly content with the support being paid
under a separation agreement.
Mr Ziff's biographical note was incomplete, and
should read;
BA (Carleton) LLB (Ottawa) MLit candidate Magdalen
College Oxford. He is grateful to Ms Rosi Kerr for her
assistance in preparing his article.
Correction
In the title to the article by Arthur Leonoff and
Maureen O'Neil, the word, Psychological, is mis-
spelled: see (1979) volume 2 number 3 at page
192.
